What Should the West Want in Ukraine?
The part of this piece where I make predictions for the future was written last weekend. I think my forecast looks pretty good relative to the public conversation at that time.
I have no special knowledge of the events in Ukraine, but from superficially reading the commentary, I have been struck by the unacknowledged diversity of goals the West has right now. I think there are four separate objectives each indicating different response: deny the legitimacy of a Russian sphere of influence, preventing a war, maintaining the taboo of European countries using force against each other, and improving the West’s relative balance of power.
Before I outline the conflict recommendations each of these goals imply, I’ll give a brief baseline of where I think the situation is. Mostly, this is for “pundit accountability.”
15% chance that the US grants sufficient public concessions to mollify Russia. As I will cover in the first point, I view this scenario as unlikely, because the US foreign policy establishment views it as unacceptable to publicly acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence, while perceiving little cost to us from an actual Russian intervention.
75% chance that in the next two months Russia launches some major interference of Ukraine’s sovereignty that is still short of occupying Kiev. This intervention could range from a major cyber attack (bigger than the already huge NotPetya attack, which was estimated by some to have shrunk Ukraine’s GDP by a full percentage point), to putting radioactive chemicals in the water table, to military invasion in Eastern Ukraine, etc. Under this scenario, the Russian troops on the border serve to deter any strong Ukrainian counter-escalation against Russia’s initial move.
5% chance of a war so large that Kiev is occupied by ground forces. Such a war would be very bloody and expensive, while I believe that Russia can gain effective control over Ukraine simply with option 2.
5% chance that Russia is mostly bluffing and will back down without major public concessions. Unlikely, as this would have been a hugely expensive and embarrassing bluff. Also, the West gave a minimal response to Crimean annexation and the NotPetya attack. After setting the occupation Kiev as a conceivable possibility, the West would be unlikely to heavily retaliate for “only a small incursion” (as Joe Biden was honest enough to admit). Seems to me that a total capitulation would be a very strange response, when Russia would suffer so little blowback from option 2.
That’s how I view Russia, but what about the West? A shocking amount of the commentary seems to boil down to mood affiliation: Russia Bad!, Democracy Good!, thus Defend Ukraine. The problem with this theory is two fold. Fist, Ukraine is barely a democracy. Freedom House (an arm of American foreign policy) is honest enough to rank Ukraine slightly bellow the hated Hungary and slightly above recently reclaimed Hong Kong. But, second, even if Ukraine had an impressive political or economic system, Western commentators usually give zero analysis of relative capabilities, costs, and practicalities of a recommended policy. But, for those few people who are engaged in instrumental reasoning, here are the four different things they are often trying to accomplish.
First, prevent a war. Most of blob-critical commentary (Western commentators outside the foreign policy consensus) on this topic has avoiding bloodshed as its implicit priority. The obvious conclusion is to give Russia what it wants. Despite Russia’s recent demand that all former Warsaw pact countries (except East Germany) be ejected from NATO, these writers think that demand is simply a negotiating position and Russia will be satisfied by an Western declaration that Ukraine will not join NATO. You can see why Russia would want this. Despite our protestations that NATO is purely defensive, joining the alliance would involve drastically increased military to military relations with the US and would free our arms industry to sell Ukraine a whole new raft of weapons aimed at countering Russia. Furthermore, the distinction between offense and defense is fundamentally fake. If article five protection was able to deter Russian military intervention, Ukraine would have greater freedom to inflict economic pressures or set linguistic standards inimical to Russia and Russian-speaking Ukrainians.
From these writers’ perspective, Russia simply wants Ukraine to remain in their sphere of influence, because of its proximity, their historical ties to the country, and their desire to protect the interest of Russian-speaking minority. Importantly, these considerations are relatively specific to Ukraine and a handful of countries, not all of Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, America’s connection to Ukraine is… ? It is rather unclear that America would even want Ukraine in NATO (all those expensive American weapons could plausible end up on the black market sold by corrupt Ukrainian officials), and it is rather clear that Germany does not want Ukraine in NATO. At this point, a conflict seems mind bogglingly stupid when both sides agree on the substantive issue (no Ukraine in NATO) but America refuses to put the position in writing. So, why not just give Russia what it wants and prevent bloodshed.
Second, deny the legitimacy of a Russian sphere of influence. I think this is the main motivation of the foreign policy blob, and why I doubt America would ever publicly nix Ukrainian accession to NATO. They believe that the idea of a liberal international order independently of immediate practical effects. The liberal respect for national sovereignty means no non-American country is formally permitted a sphere of influence. Of course, everyone acknowledges that the entire global will not actually form to this version of political legitimacy. So, they can allow Rwanda’s de facto control the Eastern DRC or Saudi’s immense influence over Sunni Arab states because they happen informally in the most unstable parts of the “developing” world. In these places, the immediate alternatives seem potentially very bloody and you can tell yourself the cope that something call “progress” and “development” will change the basis of Arab political legitimacy into a system of nation states. But, to formally acknowledge a non-liberal order in Europe would be completely anathema. For that reason, do not expect any public US concessions on Ukraines choices.
Of course, Ukraine could choose to renounce NATO membership forever, and this week some moves were taken in that direction. My sense is that would be quite unpopular in Ukraine and that it would little ability to stick. Pressuring one Ukrainian government to say they are uninterested in NATO would only be useless as soon as the pressure went away. Only a statement from NATO itself would reassure Russia.
Third, maintain the taboo of European countries using force against each other. This more general goal is the objective I am most sympathetic too. It argues that we have limited interests in Ukraine itself, but a big interest in European affairs remaining peaceful. You don’t need to be a history buff to know that the German-Russian security dilemma can be a fierce one. For right now, German-Russian confrontation is unthinkable, but to keep it that way Eastern Europe needs to be generally at peace. If Russia begins to use the threat of war in all negotiations with Eastern European countries, then that security dilemma becomes thinkable and as soon as it is thinkable it will be very expensive for the US to maintain detterence. That was the strategic logic for NATO’s expansion East. Keeping a buffer between Germany and Russia is the worlds most important case good fences making good neighbors. For that reason, America definitely wants to see a placid Eastern Europe.
However, it is ambiguous what policy implications you would draw from this. Concessions to Russia might avert war and maintain a taboo on the use of force in the region. On the other hand, concessions might incentive Russia to try the strategy again. You could say that the US already has a buffer with NATO, so that Russian intervention in the Ukraine and Moldova should not concern us at all as long as the independence of NATO countries remains sacrosanct. I think this legalism misses how democratic politics and credibility works. If the US shows zero interest in the sovereignty of Ukraine, it becomes hard for the American public, Russia, and NATO members to see why America should or will care about Estonia. Specialist can say Estonia is a much more impressive country, and International law fanatics can read aloud article five and explain how different the situations are. But to the perception, of everyone important, it would enforce the idea that America really does not care about Eastern Europe, and that could make it much more appealing for Russia to test resolve there. (For more on this idea, read Thomas Christensen’s Useful Adversaries.) I am certainly not calling for America to go to war over Ukraine, but I think granting more weapons to Ukraine and deepening deployments of American troops and missiles in Russia near abroad in the event of war is a sensible policy. It imposes a cost on Russia which will hopefully make them think twice before doing it again, and it signals that America intends to keep its actually important commitments in Eastern Europe.
Fourth, improve the West’s relative balance of power:
Compared to Russia. If Russia invades Ukraine, they will be stuck with the quagmire of occupation or supporting a larger Russian-speaking break away region. They will have their economy hit with serious economic sanctions that will slow technology diffusion and slow their long term growth. They will have more American and western military deployments in their near abroad. In the past five years, the president of France called NATO “braindead” and the German public rated America as the greatest threat to world peace. Not anymore! Get ready to breath new life into NATO. Then, you will remove more Russian-speakers from the Ukrainian electorate (just like you did in Crimea) and you will make the rest the country passionately hate you. Say goodbye to all your soft-power in the country you are supposedly trying to “win”. Finally, you will be more dependent on China (for example as a market for their gas.). To me this dynamic seems like the dirty secret of America strategy. Trans-atlanticists will scream about preventing war, but war will likely solidify Americas relationship with and commitment to Europe, while isolating Russia, which is their larger goal. At that point, why grant Russia a concession when they are holding a gun to their own head?
Compared to China. If Russia does go through with this war, America has committed to economic sanctions and enlarging its military footprint in Europe in response. For China, this must seem pretty congenial. Russia will be more diplomatically and economically isolated hence more dependent on you. If Europe is buying less Russian gas, that incentives them to actually build trans-Siberian pipelines to you. They might get kicked out of the western financial system, which would only add to the power of your system if you get a chunk of the expelled Russian money. Finally, at a time when America says it wants to pivot to Asia, more US troops being sent to Poland and Romania, can only mean fewer resources moved into the first island chain. For this reason, I would bet that a lot of American Hawks might end up being less Hawkish than they sound right now in the event of a war. Resources they commit to punishing Russia might detract from the competition they care more about.
I think those are the relevant considerations. As to what the right answer is…that is anyone’s guess