What's Eric Zemmour's Problem
In an ordered list of the many things I am unqualified to recommend, political strategies for French presidential candidates must rank high. But, I have just finished René Rémond’s excellent history of French Conservatism, and it ties in so nicely with current events that I can’t resist.
Some Background: Eric Zemmour was a pugnacious, right-wing journalist, and is now an underdog, but credible, presidential candidate. Importantly, he is still third or fourth in the polls, so his campaign has long shot, but plausible, shot at making it to the run off. As best I can tell, his journalistic career was as France’s high-brow Ann Coulter or Mark Steyn. Some of his titles include the Suicide of France (on Immigration and French Identity) and The First Sex (a rejoinder to Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex). Hopefully, you get the idea.
He launched his presidential campaign with a video of him in a library speaking into an anachronistic radio microphone. I’m told this is an homage to De Gaulle’s radio addresses, and importantly, De Gaulle is one of only four political figures named in the speech. The others being Napoleon, Georges Clemenceau, and Jean Moulin; the last two were both men of the left who were heroes of the respective world wars. Not exactly, far-right hagiography. Most of his speech concerns a sense of lost cultural identity in its most highbrow. Listing the names of early modern philosophers, essayists, and poets that putatively France is forgetting as it becomes captured by global, woke (read english-speaking) culture. To make it as French as possible, at one point he is shown eating a soft-cheese while wearing a scarf. In the second half, he lays out his program: reduced immigration and improved industrial policy; support for small business and stricter treatment for criminals; more merit-based educational programs and less European Union.
Only one section made me cringe: He says he is running for president so that “our children and grandchildren will not know barbarism. So that our daughters are not veiled and our sons are not forced to submit.”
Here is his announcement with English subtitles. I found it worth my time. (Youtube has it age restricted, because it contains some very quick shots of crime and disorder. I suspect they would not have restricted a similar video from a candidate of the left.):
That’s Zemmour. Now, onto Rémond. In La Droite en France, he distinguishes between three different strains of French Conservatism: Legitimism, Orleanism, and Bonapartism. In reverse order, Bonapartism is emphasizes themes of Nationalism and Democracy in support of a strong executive. Napoleon III, the plebiscitary emperor of France from ~1851 to 1871, and Charles De Gaulle are the exemplars of this tradition. Bonapartists are defending the common man against snooty Leftist intellectuals, capitalists, and (in the 19th century) lords. All of these institutions and sources of authority are suspect, only the democratically-elected executive of the country can truly be trusted. That’s why that despite their cultural conservatism, the Bonapartists still often fought with the institutional Catholic Church. This preference for executive authority leads to a lot of centralized state control both economically and culturally. Into the 70’s by government decree, French TV suppressed documentaries about the Holocaust claiming that (given Vichy) they were too divisive. That’s the Democratic aspect. What about the nationalism?
Targeting both the students of ‘68 and titans of industry can make Bonapartism seem at once both left and the right, and that’s exactly how Bonapartists like it. In French assembly parties sit left to right in order of political orientation (this is the origin of the odd political association we give ordinal directions ), the Bonapartist parties always try to insist on sitting in the center. France contains in incredible diversity of political traditions: romantic Catholics and supporters of Laicite; cheerleaders for Third World revolutions and an army that still views West Africa as in some sense French. In the time since the American revolution, they have had five Republics, two empires, two monarchies, and one fascist regime. The Bonapartist solution to this division is to pretend it does not exist, and unite the country around the idea of the THE GRANDEUR OF FRANCE. What does the THE GRANDEUR OF FRANCE mean? Well, that’s sort of up to the listener. Eric Zemmour’s announcement video is a great example. He lists about 50 French figures and tradition that are supposedly being forgotten. Never mind that these figures often despised each other; some were Catholic, others were Revolutionaries. They all exemplify THE GRANDEUR OF FRANCE, and each listener can fill in for his or herself what unites them all.
Charles De Gaulle’s speech upon the Liberation also play this card. He faced a problem that there had been widespread collaboration with the Nazi, and even more inconveniently, the people who actually took up arms in the Resistance were largely communists who he wanted to exclude from politics. His solution was to just lie, claim that the French people collectively resisted occupation and had succeed. He makes no mention of the Vichy government (later he claims that it had never legally existed so that no new formal constitution is needed) and he makes no mention of the leftist partisans who had done the actually fighting. Instead, he praises all of France for its grand resistance. These fudges of history are an obvious political expedient and easy to mock. But, for such a politically divided country, you can see how they buy social peace.
Next, there are the Orleanists. They will feel the most familiar to people acclimated to “classical liberalism” Anglophone conservatism. Composed of an up-market slice of bourgeoisie, they favor relatively laissez-faire economic, the primacy of the legislature over the executive, infrastructure projects, the personal liberties of speech/conscience, and soft-social conservatism. (I describe their social conservatism as soft in the sense that they valorize “common sense” ideas around hard work, stable families, sobriety, and patriotism; it will be left to the Legitimism to pine for the most illiberal parts of Catholicism.) Of course, the class interests and cultural sensibilities of their constituents will at times conflict with their stated values. So despite their economic liberalism, they often support protectionism or agricultural subsidies, to the advantage of their business men voters. Meanwhile, their defense of personal liberty against the tyranny of left revolutionaries did not restrain them from seeking to outlaw the Communist party.
They are called the Orleanist in homage to France’s first experiment with constitutional monarchy. After the end of the Revolution (and Napoleon), the old kings of France returned and tried to put the genie back in the bottle, never accepting many of the liberal innovations of the intervening 25 years. In 1830, Louis Philippe, of the Orleans branch of the Bourbon family, came to power, eagerly embraced the principle of constitutional limitations, and began purging the far-right. This small-c conservative compromise to political realities is an important part of their sensibility.
By the twentieth century, monarchy had gone out of fashion, so Orleanist political parties often describe themselves as simply Republicans. For example, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing’s political party was the Independent Republicans. That’s why many right-wing positions in contemporary politics (like France’s slightly porous ban on any race-conscious state policies) are described as “Republican”, even as in other contexts “Republican” can harken back the radical tradition of the revolution.
Finally, we reach the far-right: the Legitimists or Ultras. People often make the mistake of thinking extreme conservatism or orthodox religion are hold overs from our pre-modern history and the tide of progress will slowly wash their antiquated beliefs away. But, reading up on the Legitimism has reinforced my view that these movements should be read as responses to modernity rather than as premodern traditions carried forward purely by force of habit.
Legitimism began as the Revolution ended. Various aristocrats, cardinals, and royal administrators returned to some form of their former stature, as the Bourbon monarchy was restored. However, instead of just returning to status quo ante, Legitimist intellectuals argued to a return of a form of government that had been dead for over 100 years. In effect they argued that Absolutism was a stepping stone to the tyranny of the revolution, and that France should return to more medieval customs of the King sharing power with a body representing lords, bishops, and other assorted notables. Furthermore, they changed the king's coronation ceremony in a telling way. The absolutist monarchs had been crowned in efficient ceremonies at Versailles, the seat of government. The Ultras created a lengthy ritual stepped in Catholic mysticism to take place at Reims Cathedral. They were “conserving” traditions that were long gone. Ultraism in politics or Orthodoxy in religion are not small-c conservative people stuck in the past of their early life. Their whole worldview tries to imagine an organic society or faith unmolested by modernity and for that very reason would be inconceivable without the progress they decry.
In the French tradition, Ultraism went through several phases. I described the Catholic and aristocratic counter-revolution movement above. But, throughout French history elements within politics, but more often the military and intellectual life, have argued that historical experience indicates societies must respect natural hierarchies that liberalism ignores: hierarchies of the well-born versus the common, men versus women, the martial versus the weak, etc. The substantial portion of the French military and right that were more the passive participants in the Vichy regime attest to this traditions enduring character. So if you ever wonder why French generals in the 21st century sign open letters predicting civil war, how alt-right forefathers like Alian De Benoist can win the Prix de l'essai from the Académie Française, or how France’s top novelist Houellebecq so easily imagines liberalism’s overthrow by Transhumanism or Islamism, the Ultra tradition in French life is the answer.
Despite their admitted reaction, the French Ultras have often been associated with three seemingly progressive ideas: personal liberty of conscience, mass suffrage, and Distributism. After the terror of the Revolution, the French right took on the mantle of protecting the rights on conscience. This association continues to the present day, perhaps because advocating for free speech is prudent for people with marginal and unpopular beliefs. As for the suffrage, illiterate Catholic peasants are a great constituency for Ultraism, so it is no wonder that in the 19th century, Ultras would try to outflank Republicans on the issue. Lastly, their support for Distributism seems quite genuine, and I can theorize no ulterior motives here. Distributism is a theory of economic policy that seeks to redress inequality through means other than government bureaucracies and redistribution. It seeks to strengthen industry and trade organizations to provide social insurance that way. It seeks a nation of independent small business not dependent on the state or exploited by large companies.
Rene Remmond claimed that the National Front was the contemporary manifestation of Ultraism. That may have been more true in the 70’s when Remmond made that statement. But, I am dubious it applies today if it ever did. Every European country now has a National Front style party, so why can’t we simply explain them as the predictable response to muslim immigration rather than as this specific French tradition. Furthermore, while the National Front especially under the elder Le Pen held despicable views, it is a mistake to simply call every odious figure of the right an Ultra. At its core Ultraism is the rejection of liberalism and democracy. I think that the National Front probably conceives of it self as defending democracy against cosmopolitan elites. They may have an exclusive view of who qualifies as French, but I think they are committed to Democracy for French people. (May be wrong about this, I don’t really follow the statements of the National Front. My guess they are not thoughtful enough to qualify as Ultraism.)
Back to Zemmour:
So how can this typology help us understand the predicament of Zemmour. Though he is mostly courting the right for now, my guess is that he is attempting to set himself up as Bonapartist for the run off against Macron. His announcement was all about the GRANDEUR OF FRANCE. He has even claimed that after his election he would hold a referendum on granting the president power to overturn the judiciary. From the LRB: “Zemmour has, in true Bonapartist style, promised a referendum immediately after his election to rubberstamp his ability to stop the courts blocking his measures – in effect, to allow him to rule as a dictator.” Napoleon III would be proud.
Fundamentally, he has three problems. First, he made his journalistic career by flirting with Ultraism, so can he now credibly pose as a figure of Bonapartist nation unity. Ultraism has a storied tradition of success in France republic of letters, but the actual republics have never returned an Ultra government since the 1820’s. To beat Macron, (and potentially to win the first round by seeming the only right-winger who could beat Macron) Zemmour would need to preform one of the great reinventions of political history. In his announcement video, you can see him laying the seeds for this transformation. Zemmour, defender of France’s republican tradition, language, and customs, is going to have a better shot than Zemmour, high-brow Ann Coulter.
Second, France is now something like ten percent muslim. Can you claim to be a unifying leader of all of France, while implicitly excluding less assimilated French muslims from that ‘We’. I am not sure how the French will think about that.
Third, he may lack the stature to be the next Bonapartist executive. There have only been two successful instance of Bonapatism. The first was the grandson of France’s grandest leader, Napoleon III, and the other was vindicated in fighting the Nazis when everyone else lost hope, De Gaulle. Both had an aura of authority from their association with martial success. That stature gave some plausibility to their claims of transcending left and right to represent the whole of France. Zemmour does not seem like an obvious for this role. It would be really something if the French elected third Bonapartist president whose battlefield was the the thrust and parry of TV news debates and whose enemy was Anglo-sphere wokeness. But, after 2016, everyone must admit that stranger things have happened.